In 2022, Taiwan Marine Corps Sergeant Chen Yimin was heavily in debt and in urgent need of money.
He saw an advertisement online for loan sharking on behalf of the Chinese government, which offered him a condition: hand over confidential military secrets and you will receive a cash subsidy.
Mr. Chen agreed.
Over the course of a year, he downloaded and printed top-secret documents from databases at two military bases in Taiwan, photographed them and sent them to his “business manager” via an online messaging platform.
He was paid NT$170,000 (£4,100) before his arrest in early 2023 and was later sentenced to two years and two months in prison under Taiwan’s national security law.
He is one of more than a hundred Taiwanese veterans, serving military officers and civil servants recruited to spy for Beijing in recent years as China prepares to invade Taiwan.
Taiwanese authorities have acknowledged that some of these spies may have obtained secret defense plans now in the hands of Beijing, which could weaken Taiwan’s defenses and enhance China’s offensive capabilities.
Many of them, including Mr. Chen, are currently in jail facing charges under Taiwan’s national security law, but others are believed to still be working covertly.
Bait the fish
As China conducts record-breaking military exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan, its military threat is clear. But David Xu, deputy director of Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau, explained that it is difficult to assess Taiwan’s internal vulnerability.
Ground troops participated in a long-range live-fire exercise targeting Taiwan’s northern waters on Tuesday – Eastern Theater Command/Reuters
In an exclusive interview with The Telegraph, Mr Hsu discussed in detail how China recruits spies in Taiwan, the type of intelligence the country wants to obtain and the risks posed by such espionage operations.
In 2024, Taiwan prosecuted 64 people on espionage-related charges, an increase from 48 the previous year. About 80% of them have ties to the defense forces, including active-duty personnel, while about 20% are civil servants, according to MJIB, one of nine agencies in Taiwan dedicated to mitigating the threat of Chinese espionage.
“If they find out that these retired military officers are connected to Taiwan’s political, military or diplomatic system, they will try to approach and recruit them,” Mr Hsu said.
The process usually starts with grooming, where the target is wined and dined “and then they move on to what they really want,” he said.
When face-to-face recruiting is not possible, another common strategy is to achieve goals through online banking programs or “underground banking,” such as Mr. Chen’s.
“They are looking for financially strapped soldiers and offering them loans, but they will tell them ‘you work for me and if you get this information, you don’t have to pay me back,'” Dr. Xu said, adding that they would offer rewards for particularly sensitive intelligence.
President Lai Chengde will announce a new national security plan in March 2025 – I-Hwa Cheng/AFP (via Getty Images)
Nathan Atrill, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, explained that China’s main focus is on obtaining intelligence on “Taiwan’s combat capabilities.”
“From Beijing’s perspective, every leak makes Taiwan’s deterrence appear weak. If China knew Taiwan’s mobilization schedule, radar coverage, or command and control layout, it could design attacks to exploit those weaknesses from the first minute,” he said.
“With stolen intelligence, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Drills can be conducted based on real situations: Taiwan’s actual air defense posture and combat modes, thereby shortening the planning cycle and accurately developing invasion plans around Taiwan’s blind spots. “
According to MJIB, China recruits spies in three main systems: the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, and government agencies, including intelligence agencies and the Ministry of State Security.
China recruits spies within Taiwan in a variety of ways, but a common approach is to establish contact face-to-face to build trust.
Taiwan Coast Guard/AFP Photo credit: Taiwan Coast Guard/AFP
Chinese citizens face tight restrictions in both Taipei and Beijing when traveling to Taiwan, so handlers often wait for Taiwanese citizens to travel to China, whether on business or to visit family and friends.
MJIB has also noted that some current and former officers recruit through dating apps and social media such as Facebook and LinkedIn, although this tends to be less common.
In addition to stealing classified intelligence, targets are often instructed to recruit peers to build larger networks.
In these cases, the recruiters “come from the circle to which the target asset belongs,” which includes the same political party, the same business, the same military branch and even family members, said J Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and a former Canadian intelligence officer.
In one notable example from 2023, a retired Taiwanese serviceman was first recruited by a Chinese intelligence officer and later recruited nine other current and former Army personnel who handed over intelligence on key military bases and training modules.
civilian target
While most of China’s targets are related to Taiwan’s military, Beijing also seeks civil servants and politicians.
In a high-profile case in September 2025, four men with ties to Taiwan’s president and former foreign minister were jailed for spying on behalf of China.
One of the men, Wu Shang-yu, who was a close aide to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and passed details of his travel itinerary to the Chinese government, was sentenced to four years in prison.
Another man, Ho, who was jailed for eight years and two months, had previously served as an assistant to National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu when he was Taiwan’s foreign minister.
Taiwan fighter planes patrol. China holds record military drills in waters surrounding Taiwan – Tsai Hsin-Han/Reuters
“These people are part of the government and help set the rules and our political policies and also check or audit our budget, so they are involved in a lot of government affairs,” Dr. Xu said.
Dr Xu said Beijing often relied on a unique strategy when recruiting these civil servants and their staff.
Agents will look for people studying in China and contact them through their university networks.
In China, most universities have local Communist Party members on their boards, who are often responsible for recruiting targets and then acting as liaisons between them and the rest of the government.
“When these people finish their studies in China and come back to Taiwan to work for the government or become members of Congress or hold any type of public office, they will receive instructions from China to collect information about our policies, our budget, or any type of topic they want to know about,” Dr. Hsu said.
China often recruits people who are more sympathetic to Beijing’s claims to Taiwan and express similar beliefs about “unification.”
Some of Beijing’s political targets, such as the September case, have access to high-profile politicians. Sometimes China seeks out elected officials or individuals running for office.
Beijing would then help fund their political campaigns to maximize their chances of being elected, so the government could use the individuals to help guide decision-making.
Former presidential age Huang Chorong was found guilty of espionage for China in September 2025
Several cases involve lawmakers and members of Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang, which is generally seen as much more pro-China than the current Democratic Progressive Party.
In early 2025, a former aide to three Kuomintang legislators and an aide to a local Kuomintang city government aide were arrested for Chinese espionage.
Britain got a taste of this when an espionage case involving two former English teachers, one of whom worked as a parliamentary researcher, resurfaced in September after being controversially dropped.
Both men are accused of passing sensitive information, including insight into the Conservative leadership race, to a senior official within the Chinese Communist Party.
respond to crisis
Beijing has handled hundreds of espionage cases so far and has managed to gain access to individuals with access to the highest levels of Taiwan’s government and military, which could mean critical intelligence has fallen into the hands of enemies.
For its part, the MJIB cannot discount the possibility that China has gained access to key defense programs or manipulated its agenda through government lawmakers.
“It is possible that this sensitive, classified information could be leaked to mainland China through these espionage activities, but the relevant authorities are doing their best to limit the damage,” Dr. Xu said.
Dr. Xu said some of the military’s “exercise action plans” have been adjusted in response to certain leaks, but China is tight-lipped, making it difficult to know exactly what information was leaked.
new national security package
Last year, Taiwan also paid more and more attention to combating espionage activities.
In March this year, President Jimmy Lai announced a new national security plan that listed China as a “foreign hostile force” and proposed 17 strategies to deal with China’s threats to Taiwan.
In response to China’s espionage activities within the Taiwan military, President Lai said that Taiwan will restore the military trial system, try active personnel, and modify the retirement benefits of personnel and their families.
He also proposed changing the law to increase penalties for those who express allegiance to China.
Dr Xu said the reason the numbers peaked in 2024 was because it was an election year, so China increased espionage, but the decline was also due to the government developing effective strategies.
“We think the situation is quite serious because they are trying to infiltrate Taiwan, whether it’s through the military, the administrative system, the parliament, the public sector or the private sector,” Dr. Hsu said.
“However, we believe this issue can be effectively addressed because of our strong inter-agency collaboration and capabilities.”
As of September, Taiwan had prosecuted only 15 people on espionage-related charges. This number is expected to increase to 20 cases by the end of 2025, but this is still a significant decrease from the 64 cases reported in 2024.
Experts are less optimistic, especially given the scale of China’s efforts and the risks they pose.
“Taiwan may be getting better at detecting infiltrations, but the scale of China’s efforts remains enormous,” Dr. Atrill said.
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